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GENDER INEQUALITIES AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
AGGRESSION: THE ROLE OF FEMINISM IN ACHIEVING
PEACE
Katie Heaney
Abstract International relations scholars have often looked to domestic state composition and
structure to examine root causes of interstate behavior, specifically disputes. This research
study adds to this growing body of literature by using a feminist perspective to analyze the
relationship between state-level gender equality and international military disputes. I
hypothesize that those nations with lower fertility rates and higher representations of women in
parliament, both variables taken together to represent gender equality, will engage in fewer and
less hostile military disputes. The findings of this study confirm my expectations; nations that
ascribe to egalitarian ideals and practices typically extend this framework to their international
relations as well. It is therefore suggested that future studies in peace consider the positive
effects gender equality has upon domestic and international relations.

Introduction
Scholars of international relations, a largely male-dominated discipline, have typically looked
to traditional power structures and coalition composition to explain interstate behaviors and
conflicts (Regan & Paskeviciute 2003). However, in recent years, feminist literature has criticized
this male-defined viewpoint for focusing entirely on regime characteristics without investigating
possible societal explanations (Regan & Paskeviciute 2003). These feminist scholars argue that the
male domination of international relations studies relies on a masculine conception of power
relationships and structures without considering the unique role women play (Regan & Paskeviciute
2003). It is then crucial to consider an alternative, feminist viewpoint in order to more accurately
understand international power relations. The foundation of this feminist stance is based on the
argument that domestic political actions and values will be reflected in a state’s international actions;
in other words, those states that breed conflict at home through structural inequalities will be more
likely to seek conflict abroad (Caprioli 2003). Mary Caprioli (2000, 2001, 2003) largely pioneered the
expansion of this broader argument to focus on the causal relationship between gender inequality
and interstate conflict. The present study seeks to further develop her work by updating the
quantitative analysis of military conflicts, expanding the theoretical basis for understanding women
as peacemakers, and studying how the military aggressions of those nations with higher levels of
gender equality differ from those with greater inequalities.
Many of the world’s women have seen greatly increased social, political, and economic
equality in recent decades, though no state today can boast a truly gender-equal society. This study
will argue that those states with higher gender equality will be more pacific in nature, with less
frequent military aggressions. Research on this topic provides several theoretical explanations for
this relationship. Some feminist scholars argue that the systematic subordination of women by
states relies on the belief that women are inferior, and that these patterns of discrimination, hostility,
and subordination carry over into interstate interactions (Caprioli 2000). Others point to the
gendered differences in viewpoints on war and peace. Before ultimately outlining the importance of
feminism in achieving international peace, the next section details both theoretical frameworks in
order to better explain the basis for my hypothesis.
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Domestic vs. International State Behavior
The first theoretical framework for the argument that gender inequality causes interstate
military aggression is founded in the extension of domestic structural hierarchies to international
behaviors. These feminist scholars argue that a structural system that breeds norms of violence and
oppression will extend these behaviors to the international level because a culture of superiority and
subordination will be reflected in the decision-making processes of those states’ leaders (Caprioli
2003). Those states that are committed to structural equality will support freedom and diplomacy
while also rejecting hierarchical subordination and the use of force or aggression (Caprioli 2003). As
such, the more a society values structural equality, the more likely it will reject military aggression as
a viable solution to interstate disputes. Gender inequality remains one of the most prevalent forms
of structural inequality worldwide; therefore, it follows that this broader theory is, at least in part,
behind the causal relationship between gender inequality and military aggression.
The Gender Gap in Opinions on War
The second theoretical framework behind my research question involves the so-called
“gender gap” between men’s and women’s views on the use of military force. This framework is
divided into two main groups: the “essentialists” vs. the “constructivists;” in other words, nature vs.
nurture, respectively (Melander 2005). A third group, called the “consequentialist” perspective,
focuses more on the role that women’s interests play in their differing views on military aggression.
In the next section, I will describe each theory in detail and explain how each provides support for
my hypothesis.
Essentialism
Proponents of the essentialist argument, at the most extreme end of the theoretical
continuum, contend that women’s natural reproductive role leads them to an inherent and
compassionate aversion to violence, extending their role as caregiver from the personal to the
international level (Melander 2005). This belief is based on the fundamentally unalterable
differences between men and women, such as higher levels of testosterone in males and the birthing
capabilities of women (Nincic & Nincic 2002). Carol Gilligan (1982) found that women consistently
demonstrated the tendency to care for others and to prefer “harmonious human relations” to
personal achievements and conquests, while men were more likely to value competition and rivalry.
Essentialists argue that women’s biological maternal instincts lead them to reject a distinction
between individual and collective forms of violence, viewing both as equally objectionable (Melander
2005). Because essentialists believe the gender gap stems from biological differences, they do not
believe that the gap can be closed; in other words, men will not become more peaceful, nor women
more aggressive (Nincic & Nincic 2002). The essentialist argument leads us to infer that when
women are more equal in a society, and therefore able to influence political action, states will be less
likely to initiate aggressive military force, which contradicts women’s natural caretaking disposition
(Melander 2005).
Constructivism
Some feminist scholars challenge the essentialist point of view, insisting that it only serves to
reinforce traditional feminine stereotypes that support their continued subordination by men, and
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that there are no “essential components” that define all women (Melander 2005). These scholars
often instead support the constructivist point of view, which argues that female aversion to violence
is not biologically inherent but rather associated with socially constructed definitions of femininity
(Melander 2005). From this viewpoint, men are “assigned” to the masculine role of potential
warrior, valuing honor and one’s manhood, while women are assigned the roles of the male’s
audience in front of which men must perform their strength (Melander 2005). Feminist
constructivists argue that when men and women are forced to conform to these traditional gender
roles, men will seek violent action and the establishment of domination (Melander 2005).
Constructivists believe that evolving cultural norms and stereotypes could modify the current ‘social
construction’ of gender and therefore close the gender gap; however, gender roles today are deeply
entrenched in society (Nincic & Nincic 2002). If it is true that men are more aggressive than women
because of their learned tendency to behave like “warriors,” then as long as men continue to
dominate political power and society, state policies will reflect those macho-militant norms (Caprioli
2003). If this is indeed the case, I would then expect to find that those cultures that enforce strict
gender roles upon their citizens will more often seek aggressive action in the international arena.
Furthermore, those states that reject these traditional roles will replicate that pattern of equality and
diplomacy in their relations with other states.
Consequentialism
Instead of addressing inherent or constructed explanations for women’s differing views on
war, the third perspective, consequentialist, identifies women’s interests as the basis for the gender
gap in military aggression opinions. From this perspective, women’s propensity to oppose military
action stems from the fact that they are increasingly the major victims of war (Nincic & Nincic
2002). Though they may not participate proportionally in the frontlines of battle, women suffer
disproportionately as civilian targets and from the contextual results of modern war – sexual
violation, widowhood, poverty, loss of sons and husbands, the responsibility to care for victims, etc.
(Nincic & Nincic 2002). Feminist scholars argue that war is “particularly devastating to women in
ways that matter most to them…apart from the issue of sexual violence, there is the fact that the
majority of those displaced by war are women and children” (Nincic & Nincic 2002). Therefore, in
weighing the costs and benefits of possible military action, women are likely to consider the variety
of risks at hand for themselves and ultimately oppose aggressive action.

Feminism’s Role in the Pursuit of Peace
Having investigated several theoretical frameworks for understanding military aggression, it
is important to understand how feminism (and the resulting societal gender equality that stems from
the acceptance of its tenets) plays a role in establishing peaceful societies. Feminism is the belief
that women and men are equal, have the right to equal opportunity, and have the right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of sex. Those nations that ascribe to the beliefs of feminism
(whether labeling it as such or not) reflect a commitment to its values: democracy, freedom, equality,
and self-government (Conover & Sapiro 1993). Furthermore, it is not just the commitment to
democratic values that connects feminism and feminist societies to an antimilitaristic worldview, but
the actual application of those values in society. Feminist theory of democracy involves a rejection
of “hierarchy, domination, and the use of force or exploitation; moreover, it specifically identifies
the military as bastion of sexism” (Brock-Utne 1985). Societies characterized by overt sexism and
structural violence against women tend to exhibit these same aggressive, subordinating traits in their
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interactions in the international arena. To eliminate aggression internationally, societies must also
eliminate aggression internally. In order for societies to achieve peace, leaders must possess
“openness, cooperativeness, and nurturance;” traits almost exclusively fostered in women who are
excluded from arenas of male-dominated political decision-making (Sterba 1994). Therefore,
feminist societies inclusive of women with pacific traits (whether instilled by nurture or by nature)
will ultimately be more likely to reject military aggression, owing to the theoretical opposition to
hierarchy and domination.
This research project does not seek to identify either the essentialist or constructivist
theoretical argument as the “correct” explanation of women’s tendencies toward pacifism; that
question involves a “nature vs. nurture” debate that is far beyond the scope of this analysis. Nor
does this project seek to affirm the consequentialist feminist claim that women suffer
disproportionately in times of war. Of greater importance to this research is the fact that each
theoretical framework discussed previously leads to the same expectations about international state
aggression (Caprioli 2004). In every case, the inequalities fostered between men and women at
home are causally linked to greater military aggressions abroad. Whether by nature or nurture,
women consistently oppose military action with greater frequency then men, as polling data from
the Gulf War and the War in Iraq indicate (Gallagher 1993; Morin & Deane 2002). As such, I
expect that in states where women have reached greater equality, their opinions and/or ability to
influence executive decisions should reflect a greater hesitancy to initiate military aggression. In the
next section, I will explain how this relationship will be measured by identifying the variables to be
considered.

Research Design
Previous studies in this area have often focused on the effect of gender equality on interstate
military disputes, without discriminating between the initiating and the invaded states (Caprioli 2000;
Caprioli & Boyer 2001; Regan & Paskeviciute 2003). I believe that it is more faithful to the
argument at hand to define the dependent variable as “military aggression.” In a more recent study
(2003), Mary Caprioli conducted a similar project, defining her dependent variable as “state
aggression” measured by the first state to use force in an interstate dispute. Caprioli used military
dispute data from 1978-1992, and in my research I intend to update her analysis by using the
International Military Intervention data set that includes data between 1989 and 2005. Caprioli’s
databases relied on the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, combined with an original dataset to
include a measure of the first state use of force, which was coded by Caprioli as a dichotomous
variable, coded “1” if the state was the first to use force and “0” otherwise (2003). However,
Caprioli’s personal database is inaccessible at this time, and I believe the IMI database holds certain
advantages to be explained in the following section. Still, the IMI database includes “intervener”
country codes that can be utilized in a similar manner to the MID set.
Measuring Dependent Variables – Military Aggression and Type of Conflict Pursued
Past studies, such as Caprioli’s, focus mainly on the relationship between gender equality and
interstate military aggression without examining the variation in types of dispute initiated; for
example, humanitarian or social protectionist intervention versus intimidation or pursuit of rebel
forces. Can greater gender equality not only reduce military disputes initiated, but also minimize the
hostility level of those disputes? If the theoretical frameworks for this causal relationship hold true,
I expect to find that those nations with greater gender equality will not only engage in military
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aggression less frequently, but will also engage in a different, less hostile brand of military
interaction.
While the MID database includes some measures of hostility (levels 1-5), it lacks in
description of the type of conflict pursued by the aggressor. This information, provided by the IMI
database, is crucial to understanding the relationship between gender equality and military
aggression. I will include a measure of the type of troop activity initiated (i.e. humanitarian vs.
territorial) and the numbers of both troops and casualties incurred, as an operational definition of
aggression and violence. Military disputes can be coded with a dummy variable for “less aggressive”
interventions: humanitarian or protectionist (1 for yes, 0 for no), as well as for each type of “more
aggressive” intervention (defined as any of the following IMI variables: pursuit of rebel forces,
strategic intervention, or territorial intervention), again coded 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”. This data
will allow for a unique opportunity to examine the level of hostility and military aggression initiated
by gender-equal versus gender-unequal states. If women are indeed more pacific, we would expect
that their equal inclusion and opportunity in society will cause those states to initiate military conflict
both less frequently and in a less hostile manner – for example, for humanitarian efforts as opposed
to the intent to gain territory.
These measures are subjective, having been identified by type by the creators of the IMI
database. As such, it is important that this study also consider objective measures of military
violence. Casualties are one such measure; the greater the hostility level, the more casualties
expected as a result. This data is obtained from the variable “Total Civilian Casualties on both Sides
(Killed/Wounded).” This measure is a comprehensive indicator of military aggression, as the
presence of civilian casualties represents a hostile invader, targeting not only military bases and
officials but average citizens as well. The measure “Amount of Troop Incursion” is also employed
as an indicator of military aggression. This data, available from the IMI database, is organized
categorically in the following manner:
0 = None
1 = 1 – 1000
2 = 1001 – 5000
3 = 5001 – 10,000
4 = 10,000+

The explanation behind the use of this variable as a measure of military aggression is that a larger,
more aggressive conflict should necessarily involve a higher troop presence. The higher the number
of troops sent into battle, the more violence is expected as a result.
Measuring Independent Variables - Gender Equality
The independent variable will be defined as “gender equality,” which I plan to measure in
two different ways. One important measure of gender equality is fertility rate, frequently utilized in
past studies of this topic (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003). In those states where women’s societal role
is defined by their motherhood, it follows that they have less opportunity to enter the labor force,
become politically active, or gain social independence. Therefore, fertility rate has the capability to
measure women’s social equality and opportunity beyond motherhood, capturing the “interrelation
among social, economic, and political access” (Caprioli 2002). Fertility has consistently been shown
to correlate with women’s status, insofar as higher fertility rates go hand-in-hand with poorer health,
lower education and employment rates, and lower levels of decision making (Caprioli 2002).
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Fertility rate data is obtained from the World Bank and will be organized into four
categories, 1-4, ordered in groups of low to high fertility rates.
1 = 1.1 – 1.5 average fertility rate
2 = 1.501 – 2.1 average fertility rate
3 = 2.101 – 4.7 average fertility rate
4 = 4.701 – 7.5 average fertility rate

After collecting fertility rate data from the World Bank and identifying rates closest in time to a
nation’s military conflicts given the available data, this measure was divided into four groups to best
represent the data categorically. The groups were divided based on the best possible approximation
to a normal distribution of data; therefore, the majority (~66%) of cases fall in categories 2 and 3,
while about 34% of the cases are approximately divided between categories 1 and 4. Because most
countries fall near the median range of fertility rates, with fewer nations having an extremely low or
extremely high rate, these categories attempted to mirror that relationship with a near-normal
distribution and subsequent categorical division. Because there is little variation in fertility rate per
country over the span of this study, it is important to consider another, more flexible measure of
gender equality. Percentage of women in parliament will therefore contribute to the robustness of
this variable, ensuring that each state’s gender equality is measured in two distinct manners.
Women with high-level decision-making powers will have greater political influence. While
fertility rate provides an extensive measure of women’s social and economic equality and can be
attributed to female political equality as well, the added measure of percentage of women in
parliament contributes to the strength of our gender equality variable by including a more robust
measure of female political equality. This variable will be measured by percentage of women in
parliament – data easily obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union statistical database. This study
will measure “percentage of women in parliament” by considering only the percentage of women in
the Lower or single House, as many nations do not have an Upper or second legislative body. The
earliest data available for many of the countries in this data set is often between the years 1992-1994,
so in cases where countries entered into conflicts previous to the data availability (for example, in
1989) the earliest percentage available is applied to those conflicts as well. Parallel to the
categorization of fertility rate data, after approximating a normal distribution of data, parliament
percentages were divided into categories 1-4, from highest to lowest representation. As such, a
category 1 for both measures represents the highest level of gender equality. This study establishes
the categories as follows:
1 = 18.101 – 48.8% female representation in the lower house of Parliament
2 = 10.901 – 18.1% female representation in the lower house of Parliament
3 = 5.601– 10.9% female representation in the lower house of Parliament
4 = 0 – 5.6% female representation in the lower house of Parliament

Again, the categorical representation of this data proves useful when comparing the means of female
representation in parliament to the five dummy variables for type of intervention.

Data Analysis
This study uses several methods to analyze the data at hand. First, to understand the
relationship between types of military conflict (e.g., humanitarian vs. territorial disputes) and gender
equality, the means of each equality measure (fertility rate and percentage of women in parliament)
are compared against the dummy variables for each type of conflict. By this measure of analysis, the
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data seems to support the hypothesis that greater gender equality leads to lesser military aggression.
This study designates humanitarian and social protective conflicts as examples of “less aggressive
conflict” because they involve an intervention based on the goal of peace and assistance. On the
other hand, pursuit, strategic, and territorial interventions are designated as “more aggressive
conflict” because the intent is based on the opposition of enemy forces or the quest for personal
gain. Because this study argues that gender-equal nations are less aggressive militarily, it follows that
the interventions gender-equal nations do become involved in will be less aggressive or hostile as
well. In nations where governments extend equal rights and opportunities to women, including
powers of decision making that allow women’s “pacifist” voices to be heard, military interventions
are expected to be kept to a minimum and to be of a different nature than those of gender-unequal
societies.
Secondly, this study uses descriptive statistics to analyze the relationship between gender
equality and the number of both troops involved and casualties incurred in military conflicts, as a
more objective measure of military aggression. I expect that greater gender equality leads to less
aggressive military disputes, resulting in a less hostile interaction that involves both fewer troops and
fewer casualties. In the next section, I will examine the results of the subjective hostility (type of
intervention) comparing means tests, before ultimately analyzing cross tabular results for the
objective measures of military aggression.
Comparing Gender Equality to Type of Intervention
As described previously, the means of each gender measure are compared to the dummy
variable (0 for no, 1 for yes) for each type of military intervention. For each type of military
intervention considered, the expectation is that fertility rate should be higher in more aggressive
conflicts and lower in less aggressive conflicts seems to hold true, while parliamentary representation
should be higher in less aggressive conflicts and lower in more aggressive conflicts. With the
possible exception of social protective interventions, the data is consistent with these expectations.
The IMI database defines the goal of a social-protective intervention as “[the intent] to protect a
socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.” I initially selected this type of intervention
as an example of a “less aggressive” conflict because the motives seem to fulfill the kind of maternal,
caring actions expected from a more gender-equal (and therefore, pacifist) nation that reflects the
attitudes of women as well as men.
Conflict Types - Social-Protective

Conflict Types - Social-Protective

3.5
12.55

Mean Fertility Rate

Female Parliamentary Representation - %

12.6

12.5
12.45
12.4

3
2.5
2
1.5
1

12.35

0.5
12.3

0
12.25
Social-protective

Non-social-protective

Type of Intervention

Social-protective

Non-social-protective

Type of Intervention

It can be said that the pattern is consistent with what is expected for a less aggressive conflict
expected: fertility rate was lower (2.017) for social-protective interventions than for interventions
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that were not (2.972). Similarly, percentage of females in parliament is higher (12.558) for socialprotective interventions than for interventions that were not (12.374). However, the difference
between protective interventions and non-protective interventions across gender equality measures
is negligible. It may be the case that social-protective interventions are not an ideal model for “less
aggressive” conflicts. Social-protective interventions may not involve overtly aggressive or powerhungry goals, but it may be that they do involve more violence than I expected, due to reactive
aggression from the majority faction in the target country. As such, the violence involved in this
type of intervention may overshadow any maternalistic or pacifist motives on behalf of the
intervening nations, making this type of intervention a poor indicator of a “less aggressive” conflict.
Still, the remaining types of intervention seem consistent with the hypothesis, as the following data
will demonstrate.

4
3
2
1
0
Humanitarian

Non-Humanitarian

Conflict Types - Hum anitarian
Female
Parliamentary
Representation - %

Mean Fertility Rate

Conflict Types - Hum anitarian
20
15
10
5

'

0
Humanitarian

Type of Intervention

Non-Humanitarian
Type

Humanitarian interventions, now the primary example of less aggressive conflicts, appear
consistent with the hypothesis’ expectation about gender-equal nations. The IMI database defines
humanitarian intervention’s goals as “to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent
starvation and so forth.” The mean fertility rate for humanitarian interventions is 2.037, while the
mean fertility rate for non-humanitarian interventions is 3.337, a substantial increase. Similarly, the
mean parliament percentage for humanitarian interventions is 14.731%, while the mean percentage
for non-humanitarian interventions is 11.178%. As expected, it seems as though those nations that
become involved in humanitarian interventions have higher levels of gender equality than those that
become involved in non-humanitarian conflicts. Therefore, it may not only be true that genderequal states engage less frequently in military disputes, but also that the disputes they do become
involved in are more pacifist in nature.

6
4
2
0
Pursuit

Non-pursuit
Type

Conflict Types - Pursuit
Female
Parliamentary
Representation %

Mean Fertility Rate

Conflict Types - Pursuit

13
12.5
12
11.5
11
Pursuit

Non-pursuit
Type

Examples of more aggressive conflicts appear consistent with the hypothesis as well. The
first example, pursuit, is defined by the IMI database as conflict that “Pursue[s] Rebel or Terrorist
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Forces across Border or into Sanctuary.” I reason that this connotes a more aggressive form of
conflict, as it involves an aggressive pursuit of the enemy beyond a nation’s own boundaries. The
mean fertility rate for pursuit interventions is 4.29, while the mean fertility rate for non-pursuit
interventions is 2.648. The mean parliament percentage for pursuit interventions is 11.553%, while
the mean parliament percentage for non-pursuit interventions is 12.524%. As
Conflict Types - Strategic

3.1
3
2.9
2.8
2.7
Strategic

Non-strategic

Female
Parliamentary
Representation - %

Mean Fertility Rate

Conflict Types - Strategic

15
10
5
0
Strategic

Non-strategic
Type

Type

expected, it appears that the nations involved in pursuit interventions, a more aggressive form of
conflict, have lower gender equality than those nations involved in non-pursuit interventions.
Another form of more aggressive intervention, strategic, follows this pattern.

3.1
3
2.9
2.8
2.7
Strategic

Non-strategic
Type

Conflict Types - Strategic
Female
Parliamentary
Representation - %

Mean Fertility Rate

Conflict Types - Strategic

15
10
5
0
Strategic

Non-strategic
Type

Strategic interventions are defined by the IMI database as “regional power balances, stability, or
ideological issues mentioned by the intervener or clearly connected to the intervention.” This form
of conflict is designated as “more aggressive” because it involves a conflict initiated for personal
gain, whether intended to grow a nation’s power in their region or to uphold the nation’s own belief
system. Though the fertility rate chart is somewhat misleading in that the difference between
conflict types is rather small, the data still follows the expected relationship: mean fertility rate is
higher (3.032) for strategic interventions and lower (2.862) for non-strategic interventions. Women
in parliament seems to be a more significant indicator of the difference between intervention types,
as the mean parliamentary percentage for strategic interventions is 10.949% as opposed to 13.392%
for non-strategic interventions. Once again, it appears that nations involved in strategic
interventions (a more aggressive type) are less gender-equal
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3.2
3
2.8
2.6
Territorial

Non-territorial
Type

Conflict Types - Territorial
Female
Parliamentary
Representation - %

Mean Fertility Rate

Conflict Types - Territorial

15
10
5
0
Territorial

Non-territorial
Type

The final type of “more aggressive” military conflict is territorial, defined by the IMI
database as the “acquisition or retention of territory, delineation of frontiers, or specification of
sovereign status.” This type is defined as more aggressive because it involves one nation
aggressively seeking to benefit itself with acquired territory or the establishment of sovereignty. The
mean fertility rate for territorial interventions is 3.147, while the mean fertility rate for non-territorial
interventions is 2.797 – again, a smaller difference. Parliamentary percentages provide a more
substantial difference though, as the mean percentage for territorial interventions is 8.453%, while
the mean percentage for non-territorial interventions is 13.283%. Again it appears that the data
supports the hypothesis, as those nations involved in territorial (aggressive) conflicts tend to be less
gender-equal, with higher fertility rates and a lower percentage of female representation in
parliament.
With the exception of social-protective interventions, which appear to be inconclusive in
terms of strengthening the hypothesis (though they still follow the expected pattern, even if only by
a hair), the relationship between conflict types and gender equality seems to support the idea that
gender-equal nations will more likely intervene in less aggressive conflicts than in more aggressive
conflicts, with the opposite being true for gender-unequal nations. In the next section, the strength
of the hypothesis will be further examined, as I test the relationship between gender equality
measures and troop/casualty levels.
Descriptive Statistics – Comparing Gender Equality to Troops/Casualties Incurred
To analyze the relationship between gender equality and troops/casualties involved in
military disputes, the established fertility rate and female parliamentary representation categories are
utilized. As described previously, these categories were developed to estimate a normal curve
representation; the majority (roughly 66%) of cases fall in the second and third categories, with the
minority (roughly 34%) falling in the extremities, categories 1 and 4. Descriptive statistical crosstabs
were run for each gender equality measure against each objective hostility/aggression measure
(number of troops, and number of casualties to civilians), equaling four total crosstabs, provided in
this study’s appendix.
The first crosstab displays the relationship between female parliamentary percentages (by
category) and number of civilian casualties on both sides (invader and target countries). The
statistical significance of this relationship is 0.258. In other words, there is a 25.8% chance that this
relationship occurred by chance, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The data fails to clearly
establish that female representation in parliament directly affects the number of civilian casualties in
military disputes. However, the other three crosstabs provide much more beneficial results.
The second test was run on the relationship between fertility rate and number of casualties
incurred in military disputes. The significance test reveals a value that passes the 0.01 significance
test, and therefore the null hypothesis that this relationship could have occurred by chance is
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rejected. Therefore, the data appears consistent with the hypothesis, in that fertility rate is positively
correlated with number of casualties in conflict; the higher a nation’s fertility rate, the more
casualties are likely to be incurred in that nation’s military disputes. This finding is consistent with
the theory that gender inequalities breed greater hostility and tendency toward violence; these
unequal nations extend their domestic norms into the international arena and therefore have a
greater propensity to violence, resulting in higher numbers of casualties during military disputes.
Two similar tests were run with another measure of military aggression, number of troops.
The first, relating female parliamentary representation to number of troops resulted in a significance
of 0.05 and the null hypothesis is rejected. This data appears consistent with the hypothesis. The
parliamentary percentages are inversely correlated to number of troops; the higher the percentage of
women in parliament, the fewer troops involved in the corresponding military dispute(s). Higher
troop levels indicate a more aggressive invading country, one in which the so-called pacifist
viewpoints of women are not included because they are ill-represented in parliament. This data
substantiates this theory, having established a significant relationship between these measures of
gender equality and military aggression.
The final test examines the relationship between fertility rate and number of troops. This
crosstab also reveals a significant relationship, with a significance value of 0.012 that allows the null
hypothesis to be rejected as well. As expected, fertility rate and number of troops are positively
correlated; the higher a nation’s fertility rate, the higher the number of troops is likely to be. High
fertility rates reflect a gender-unequal society, in which dominant-aggressive and subordinating
behaviors are the norm. It follows that these traits should then be reflected in international
interactions, which is why the results show that higher troop numbers (an indicator of high
aggressiveness) correspond with high fertility rates.

Discussion and Conclusion
This study examined the argument that gender inequalities lead to higher levels of military
aggression. Past literature has established a variety of frameworks for understanding this theory; the
essentialist vs. constructivist debate attempts to pinpoint nature vs. nurture, respectively, as the
cause for women’s apparent propensity towards peace. These scholars argue that when women are
treated as equals in society, their pacifist values will be reflected in interstate behaviors. Another sect
of this research takes a “consequentialist” view, claiming that the victimization of women in times of
war leads them to reject violence in the name of self-interest. Finally, another brand of scholars
argues that behavioral structures are responsible for this relationship; those societies that structurally
impose inequality and subordination at the domestic level will seek similar dominant behaviors
internationally.
This study attempted to add to this growing body of research in several ways. First, due to
limitations of the MID (Military Interstate Dispute) dataset, the most recent study on this topic
(Caprioli 2003) leaves off in 1992. Using the IMI database, this study has been able to include all
cross-national conflicts between the years 1989 and 2005. Secondly, past research has measured the
dependent variable, military aggression, in a variety of ways: first use of force (Caprioli 2003),
conflict duration (Caprioli 2000), or number of fatalities (Regan & Paskeviciute 2003). To my
knowledge, none of the previous studies on this topic have used any measure that goes beyond the
question of a country’s likelihood of initiating conflict to further consider the type of conflict that is
pursued. This study attempted to strengthen the evidence for a causal relationship between gender
inequality and military aggression, using the “Type of Intervention” measure. The data is consistent
with the expectation that conflicts initiated by more gender-equal states tend to be of a less
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aggressive nature. This measure permits a deeper understanding of aggressive military behaviors
with respect to the types of actions pursued by gender-equal vs. gender-unequal states.
Analysis of the data results shows a definite consistency with the hypothesis. When
considering types of intervention, every category displayed a substantial difference between genderequal and gender-unequal states, save for “social protection,” which displayed a negligible difference.
In “peaceful” interventions (humanitarian), both fertility rates and parliamentary percentages
reflected interveners that were much more gender-equal than those initiating non-humanitarian
conflicts. The opposite held true for “aggressive” interventions (pursuit, strategic, and territorial),
with interveners more likely to be gender-unequal, and with higher fertility rates and lower
percentages of women in parliament.
In the analysis of this study’s objective measures of military aggression, number of civilian
casualties and number of troops incurred, the data displayed further consistency with the hypothesis.
With the exception of the relationship between parliamentary percentages and number of casualties,
each tested relationship showed a high level of significance (<0.05). The data supports the idea that
greater gender equality leads to lesser military aggression. It should be noted that both tests using
fertility rate as the measure for gender equality had more highly significant results (0.000 for
casualties, 0.012 for troops) than those that used parliamentary percentages (0.258 for casualties,
0.050 for troops), so it can be inferred that the relationships using fertility rate as the measure for
gender equality are less likely to have occurred by chance than those using percentages of women in
parliament.

Areas for Additional Research
This study has corroborated the argument that domestic gender equality reduces the
aggressiveness of military conflict, and results in a greater propensity towards peaceful rather than
violent interventions. Because structural domination of women is far from being the only type of
inequality fostered by governments internationally, it would be interesting to examine the
relationship between domestic racial equality and international state behavior as well. I would expect
to find a similar pattern to the findings of this study, though accurate indicators of racial equality
may not be so easy to come by; there may not be a racial equivalent of “fertility rate” as a measure
that encompasses all realms of equality.
The measure of female representation in parliament was used to approximate gender
equality, and this study maintains that it is a valid measure in understanding the level of equality a
woman experiences in society. Higher percentages of women in parliament seem to go hand-inhand with lower fertility rates across the data collected here. Still, it is difficult to assert that the sole
position of any number of women in a legislative body gives them substantial influence on policy.
Certainly, common sense leads us to believe that a higher percentage of women in parliament leads
to greater influence by virtue of a louder voice, but in nations where “equality” is a standard
enforced by quota and not by feminist ideals, how can we know for sure that those female legislators
have a say in policy that is proportional to their numerical representation? The extent to which
women in parliament directly influence the direction of policy may be difficult to measure, though
tallies of votes in support or opposition to major policy decisions along with the subsequent vote
result might be available in developed countries at least. Additional research that measures women’s
influence on the policy process would be extremely beneficial in truly understanding international
gender equality.
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Appendix
X = Parliamentary Percentages
Y = <umber of Casualties
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

79.378a
77.522
.459

72
72
1

.258
.307
.498

171

a. 96 cells (96.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count
is .15.

X = Fertility Rate
Y = <umber of Casualties
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

1.552E2
137.905
6.662

81
81
1

.000
.000
.010

193

a. 108 cells (96.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is .12.

X = Parliamentary Percentages
Y = <umber of Troops
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

21.057a
22.755
.652

12
12
1

.050
.030
.419

263

X = Fertility Rate
Y = <umber of Troops
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

25.670a
26.867
1.320

12
12
1

.012
.008
.251

288

a. 5 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
1.09.
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